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PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: NORMATIVE MODELS 
AND CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL SYSTEMS




 Pregledni znanstveni rad
 Primljeno: srpanj 2018.
The paper attempts to examine a philosophy of punishment in the normative 
perspective and to penetrate the structure of the fundamental premises and theses 
of retributivism. Punishment concepts are discussed in relation to two contexts and 
types of expressions formulated in the philosophy of punishment – normative and 
descriptive. The former are a matter of axiology and normative models, whereas 
the latter constitute a description of existing systems of criminal responsibility. The 
considerations are centred on a retributive model. The model of retributivism involves 
normative premises and consists in seeing these premises not as unconditionally 
binding directives, but as optimization rules, a kind of prima facie duty. These are 
mainly the quasi-legal duties of the state considered from the point of view of criminal 
policy. Retributivism can be seen as a set of norms (rules) for constructing legal 
system. The core of the paper consists in outlining such a concept. The inspiration 
for it was provided above all by the ideas of the Polish legal theory, R. Dworkin, 
W. D. Ross and R. Alexy, and modern retributivists.
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part of the considerations.
**	 I	am	grateful	that	I	had	the	opportunity	to	discuss	this	article	during	my	stay	at	the	
Faculty	of	Law	of	the	University	of	Greifswald	(Germany).






The	word	 ‘success’	or	 the	word	 ‘failure’	 give	a	good	 reflection	of	 smooth	nature	
of	philosophical	 criteria	and	concepts.	Cf.	Fuller,	L.,	The Morality of Law: Revised 
Edition,	Yale	University	Press,	New	Haven,	1969,	pp.	33-37;	Murphy,	C.,	Lon Fuller 
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lates,	 recommendations	 and	directives	 regarding	what	punishment	ought	 to	



















6	 Cf.	Aleksander,	A., Philosophy of Criminal Law,	in:	Coleman,	J.;	Shapiro,	S.	J.	(eds.),	
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford Handbooks),	Oxford	
University	Press,	Oxford,	2011,	pp.	815-867.	
7	 Chiao,	V.,	Two Conceptions of the Criminal Law,	in:	Flanders,	C.;	Hoskins,	Z.	(eds.),	The 
New Philosophy of Criminal Law,	Rowman	and	Littlefield,	New	York,	2016,	pp.	20-36.
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London,	1963,	pp.	6-16.
9	 Morris,	H.,	Persons and Punishment,	The	Monist,	no.	52,	1968,	pp.	475–501;	Tunick,	
M.,	Punishment. Theory and Practice,	University	of	California	Press,	Berkeley–Los	An-
geles–Oxford,	1992,	pp.	69	ff.;	Lucas,	J.	R.,	Responsibility,	Oxford	University	Press,	
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On	this	background	we	can	see	 that	normativity	may	refer	 to	 rules	 that	
determine	(a)	the	manner	in	which	punishment	is	shaped	as	a	certain	insti-















III. NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT AND RULES FOR 





a	 system	of	 criminal	 law.	The	normative	concept	of	punishment	 formulates	


































legislator	 to	be	bound	by	such	a	meta-rule	 for	 it	 to	be	 recognised	as	 legally	
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IV. NORMATIVE RETRIBUTIVE CONCEPT AND RULES FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
One	can	easily	notice	 that	 the	 functions	and	 roles	of	 these	 rules	 can	be	
multiplied.	By	necessity,	the	scope	had	to	be	limited	to	their	general	charac-
teristics.	 It	seems	that	the	normative	approach	to	the	concepts	of	 justifying	
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struction of a Legal System and the Law-Making Process],	Ruch	Prawniczy,	Ekonomiczny	
i	Socjologiczny,	vol.	LVI,	no.	4,	1994,	pp.	31-38;	Peno,	M.,	Jaśkiewicz,	J.,	op. cit. (fn.	
10),	pp.	21-25.	
12	 Cf.	Lucas,	J.	R.,	op. cit. (fn.	9),	pp.	280-287.
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2005,	pp.	36	ff.;	Anderson,	S.,	The Enforcement Approach to Coercion,	Journal	of	Ethics	
and	Social	Philosophy,	no.	1,	2010,	pp.	1–31.
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18	 Cottingham,	J.	G.,	Varieties of Retribution,	Philosophical	Quarterly,	vol.	29,	1979,	pp.	
238	ff.;	Duff,	R.	A.,	Trials & Punishment,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	
1986,	p.	289;	Morris,	H., op. cit. (fn.	9),	pp.	475	ff.	
19	 Cragg,	W.,	The Practice of Punishment: Towards a Theory of Restorative Justice, Routledge,	
London	&	New	York,	2016,	p.	12.
20	 It	can	be	called	“retributive	principle”.	See	supra.
21	 Cf.	Husak,	D.,	Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law,	Oxford	University	
Press,	New	York,	2008.































22	 Cf.	Merryman,	J.	H., The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Western Europe and Latin America,	 Stanford	University	 Press,	 Stanford,	 1969,	 pp.	
132-148;	Duff,	R.	A.,	Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal 
Law, Hart	Publishing,	Oxford-Portland,	2007,	pp.	195	ff.	
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model).25	Another	matter	is	determining	the	moment	from	which	punishment	





















promoting the nullum crimen sine poena principle.	That	goal	cannot	so	much	be	
achieved	or	not	achieved	as	achieved	gradually.	It	seems,	however,	that	they	
will	be	prima facie	duties.	In	other	words,	a	normative	framework	of	punishment	
has a prima facie character. 
Presented	 characteristic	 is	 just	 a	 proposal	 that	 should	 be	 developed	 and	
modified.	However,	these	four	elements,	taken	together,	characterize	retribu-
tivism as a general duty	to	administer	justice	in	line	with	the	retributive	model	
of	 punishment.	The	 guilty-principle	 is	 fundamental,	 however,	 as	 it	 defines	
retributivism	in	a	positive	way.	They	outline	retributivism’s	core	in	relation	to	
25	 Morris,	H.,	op. cit.	(fn.	9),	pp.	480	ff.;	Wootton,	B.,	Crime and the Criminal Law: Re-
flections of a Magistrate and Social Scientist,	Stevens	&	Sons,	London,	1981,	pp.	31–64;	
Lucas,	J.	R.,	op. cit. (fn.	9),	pp.	87–123,	280–286;	Kaufman,	A.	S.,	The Reform Theory 
of Punishment,	Ethics,	 vol.	 71,	no.	1,	1960,	pp.	49–53;	Arrigo,	B.	A.,	Social Justice/
Criminal Justice. The Maturation of Critical Theory in Law, Crime, and Deviance,	West/
Wadstworth,	Scarborough,	1998,	pp.	1–14.
26	 See:	Dworkin,	R.,	Taking Right Seriously,	Harvard	University	Press,	Harvard-Cam-
bridge,	1980.




that	 instrumental	 results	be	obtained	 through	punishment,	 is	 in	opposition	
to	the	program	of	penal	utilitarianism,	which	sees	punishment	as	a	means	to	
























27	 Kaufman,	A.	S.,	op. cit. (fn.	25),	pp.	49-53.




29	 Cf.	Tebbit,	M.,	Philosophy of Law,	Routledge,	London-New	York,	2005,	pp.	155-230.
30	 See:	Kelsen,	H., Law, State and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law,	The	Yale	Law	Journal,	
vol.	57,	No.	3,	1948,	pp.	377-390.	Cf.	Vinx,	L.,	Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legal-
ity and Legitimacy,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2007;	Clark,	R.	S.,	Hans Kelsen’s 
Pure Theory of Law,	Journal	of	Legal	Education,	vol.	22,	no.	2,	1969,	pp.	170-196.	






second one refers to an idea of prima facie obligations.31 The vision of prima facie 
duty	depends	on	interpretation.	Prima facie	duty	is	only	an	apparent	but	not	a	
real	duty;	or	a	real	duty	that	can	be	outweighed	by	more	stringent	considerations	

























breaking	 of	 a	 promise,	 for	 instance,	 it	 tends	 to	 be	wrong;	 in	 virtue	 of	 being	 an	
instance	of	relieving	distress	it	tends	to	be	right”.	Ross,	W.	D.,	Right and the Good,	
Clarendon	Press,	Oxford,	1930,	p.	19.	
32	 Dworkin,	R.,	op. cit. (fn.	26),	pp.	22	ff;	Dworkin,	R.,	The Model of Rules,	in:	Hughes,	
G.	 (ed.),	Law, Reason, and Justice,	University	 of	 London	Press,	New-York-London,	
1969,	pp.	14	 ff.	The	application	and	 interpretation	of	 law	 take	 into	account	 the	
values	coded	in	the	legal	text	by	the	legislator	in	the	law-making	process.




































33	 See:	Alexy,	R.,	On the Structure of Legal Principles,	Ratio	Juris,	vol.	13,	no.	3,	2000,	pp.	
294-304.
34	 Cf.	Hart,	H.	L.	A.,	The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,	in:	Flew	A.	(ed.),	Essays 
on Logic and Language,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	1951,	pp.	145-166.	







of	penal	abolitionism	(Nils	Christie	et al.)	are	of	the	opposite	opinion.35 This 
assumption	is	absolute	and	is	the	ethical	basis	of	retributivism	(along	with	the	
idea	of		retributive	justice).















still	ought	to	be	performed	(morally	binding).36 Besides characterizing prima facie 
duty,	Ross	proposes	a	list	of	certain	fundamental	prima facie	duties	involving	the	
duties	of	reparation	(of	a	wrong)	or	the	duties	of	justice	which	are	characteristic	
for	 retributivism.37	Ross	says	 that	one	principle	can	always	be	abandoned	 for	
another,	in	the	sense	that	some	departures	from	the	rule	are	permitted.	Ross’s	
theory,	from	the	point	of	view	of	retributivism,	is	only	a	kind	of	guideline.	More-
35	 Christie,	N.,	Crime control as Drama,	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	vol.	13	no.	1,	1986,	
pp.	1-	8.	





Rightness and Goodness. A Study in Contemporary Ethical Theory,	The	Martinus	Nijhoff,	
Hague,	1969,	p.	9.
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are	 at	 the	heart	of	 the	 legal	 system.	As	 for	practical	 consequences,	we	may	





38	 Ross,	W.	D.,	op. cit. (fn.	31),	pp.	56-64.
39	 Cf.	Ristroph,	A.,	Two Conditions of Legitimate Punishment,	in:	Flanders,	Ch.;	Hoskins,	
Z.	(ed.)	The New Philosophy of Criminal Law,	Rowman	and	Littlefield,	New	York	2016,	
pp.	76-92.	
428 Michał Peno: Philosophy of Punishment: Normative Models and Construction Principles...
It	should	be	emphasised	that	the	legislator	is	free	to	choose	the	concept	of	
punishment,	but	the	choice	made	(e.g.	related	to	the	reform	of	criminal	law)	
means	the	obligation	to	pursue	a	specific	criminal	policy.40 If the legislator adopts 
a	given	vision	of	criminal	justice,	they	should	be	consistent	and	the	degree	of	
implementation	of	the	adopted	assumptions	will	be	subject	to	assessment	and	























can	demand	stable	and	consistent	criminal	policy	on	this	basis.42 These categories 
are	blurred,	but	if	the	philosophy	of	criminal	law	has	the	ambition	to	go	beyond	
postulates,	it	must	look	for	normative	concretizations	of	its	concepts.





42	 Cf.	Duff,	R.,	A Criminal Law for Citizens,	Theoretical	Criminology,	no.	14,	2010,	pp.	
293-309;	Scalia,	A.,	The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,	University	of	Chicago	Law	
Review,	no.	56,	1989,	pp.	1175–1188.
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FILOZOFIJA KAŽNJAVANJA: NORMATIVNI MODELI 
I GRADIVNA NAČELA PRAVNIH SUSTAVA 
U radu se pokušava analizirati filozofija kažnjavanja iz normativne perspektive te 
prodrijeti u strukturu temeljnih premisa i teza retributivizma. O konceptima kažnjavanja 
raspravlja se s obzirom na dva konteksta i tipa izražavanja koji su izgrađeni u filozofiji 
kažnjavanja – normativni i deskriptivni. Prvi pripadaju području aksiologije i normativ-
nih modela, dok drugi opisuju postojeće sustave kaznene odgovornosti. Rasprava u radu 
pritom je usredotočena na retributivni model. Model retributivizma uključuje normativne 
premise te ih ne smatra bezuvjetno obvezujućim smjernicama nego pravilima optimizacije, 
na određeni način prima facie obvezom. To su u prvom redu kvazipravne obveze države 
promatrane sa stajališta kaznene politike. Retributivizam se može shvatiti kao skup normi 
(pravila) za izgradnju pravnog sustava. Jezgra je rada upravo razrada toga koncepta, pri 
čemu su inspiraciju za navedeni pristup dale teze iznesene u poljskoj teoriji prava te djela 
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